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WORKER UNITY AND THE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AND THE
HOPE FOR THE NLRA’S FUTURE
Jonathan Fox Harris*
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)1 and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act (“FLSA”)2 were passed in the same era—1935
and 1938, respectively—and both were intended to help the econ-
omy and workers recover from the devastation of the Great Depres-
sion. The Acts were viewed as significant governmental
interventions into the employer–employee relationship. With the
NLRA, Congress took a dramatic pro-worker stance, asserting that
supporting workers’ collective bargaining rights would balance the
power dynamics in the employment relationship and help to pre-
vent labor disputes.3 On the other hand, in passing the FLSA, Con-
gress did not state support for collective action; rather, its intention
was to force employers to compensate workers for individual viola-
tions in wage and hour provisions to ensure workers earned
enough to reinvest in the economy and boost the nation out of the
* Haywood S. Burns Graduate Fellow in Human and Civil Rights, J.D. Candidate
2010, City University of New York School of Law. I would like to thank Beena Ahmad,
Ellen J. Dannin, Shirley Lung, Dennis P. Walsh, Virginia Wilber, my parents, Holly
and Bob Harris, my brother-in-law, Raphael Rajendra, and my wife, Dania Rajendra,
for their thoughtful feedback and invaluable support.
1 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)). For ease of reference, each
citation to the NLRA includes the relevant NLRA section as well as the corresponding
U.S. Code section.
2 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 74–718, 52 Stat. 1067 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)). For ease of reference, each
citation to the FLSA includes the relevant FLSA section as well as the corresponding
U.S. Code section.
3 NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively . . . promotes the
flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and un-
rest, . . . and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees.”); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2685, 2686 (2008) (“Congress intended the law to facilitate worker organizing
and collective action—declaring it to be the ‘policy of the United States’ to protect
‘full freedom of association [and] self-organization’ among workers”).
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Great Depression.4 The FLSA does not provide support for collec-
tive activity as a means of equalizing power relations in the employ-
ment relationship.5
Over the years, the NLRA’s ability to support collective action
by workers, and thus to modify the power imbalance in the work-
place, has been diminished both legislatively, through the
Taft–Hartley amendments,6 and through case law. Courts and the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”), the admin-
istrative agency set up to adjudicate claims brought under the
NLRA, have restricted the classes of employees protected by and
eligible for remedies and collective representation under the
NLRA, as well as the classes of employers and associated entities
held liable for NLRA violations and susceptible to union pressure
tactics. Practically speaking, these limitations have greatly reduced
workers’ ability to organize collectively for improved conditions,
workplace power, and respect and dignity on the job. In contrast,
Congress has passed few legislative limitations to the scope of the
FLSA, and the courts have generally expanded—not limited—the
FLSA’s application over the years. But despite its gradual watering
down and the courts’ and NLRB’s partial perversion of Congress’s
stated goals, the NLRA remains a statutory regime supporting
workers’ collective action, and recent court and NLRB decisions as
well as pro-worker appointments to the NLRB7 suggest that the
NLRA has not lost all its muscle.
This Note posits that Congress, the courts, and the NLRB have
limited the original power of the NLRA because of concerns that
the NLRA disrupts fundamental power dynamics in the market
economy by allowing workers to collectively take control away from
4 FLSA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (“The Congress hereby finds that the exis-
tence . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum stan-
dard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . .
[is] burdening commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce”).
5 The FLSA does allow for collective action suits, but they rarely support worker
organizing because the process is heavily dominated by lawyers and judges. Addition-
ally, such suits are difficult to initiate because of the presumption that potential class
members are not a part of the suit unless they affirmatively opt in. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent
in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.”).
6 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft–Hartley Act), Pub. L. 80–101, 61
Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2006)).
7 President Obama appointed two new Democratic NLRB members, which cre-
ates a Democratic majority on the Board. Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock is Ending on
Labor Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B1.
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the business class.8 On the other hand, business interests and the
wealthy, long dominant in Congress and significantly represented
in the federal judiciary,9 have not viewed the FLSA as equally
threatening because the FLSA does not seek to modify the power
imbalances in the workplace. Therefore, Congress has left the
FLSA relatively intact, even expanding its worker protections, and
courts have interpreted FLSA protections relatively liberally when
compared with their treatment of the NLRA.
This Note begins by reviewing the legislative and social histo-
ries of both Acts as well as subsequent modifications to the Acts. It
also contrasts interpretations of the NLRA and the FLSA in litiga-
tion, revealing how the NLRA has generally been reduced in its
application and has even been used to divide workers, while the
FLSA and its individual rights regime have been comparatively ex-
panded in application. Specifically, this Note examines the courts’
and the NLRB’s denials of NLRA remedies and collective organiz-
ing rights to many undocumented workers10 and temporary work-
ers11 and of reducing the categories of employers and associated
entities12 liable for NLRA violations and subject to union pres-
sure.13  Meanwhile, courts approve FLSA remedies regardless of
immigration status and have expanded the application of the joint
employer doctrine, ensuring that even indirect employers are held
8 The terms “business class” and “business interest” are used interchangeably with
the term “employer.” While not all employers completely represent the interests of
the business class, enough do to allow for such a generalization for the purposes of
this Note. A detailed analysis of this dichotomy is beyond this Note’s scope.
9 See Ellen J. Dannin, University of San Francisco Law Review 2009 Symposium: The
Evolving Definition of the Immigrant Worker: The Intersection Among Employment, Labor, and
Human Rights Law, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2009) (“employee acts of
union support, employee mutual aid or protection, and other concerted actions are
unlikely to be seen by employers or courts as positive characteristics in employees;
rather, employers and courts are more likely to see them as disloyal and making an
employee unfit for employment.”); see also Posting to Free Republic blog, http://www.
freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1736536/posts (Nov. 10, 2006, 17:24 EST) (showing
net worth of surveyed congresspeople ranging from $12 million to $234 million);
Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2008) (ana-
lyzing wealth of federal judges).
10 See infra notes 55–71 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
12 In particular, courts and the NLRB have failed to recognize NLRA-imposed em-
ployer liability under the joint employer doctrine, and have failed to allow unions to
pressure employer-associated entities under the ally doctrine. See discussion infra Part
B.
13 Courts and the NLRB have also restricted NLRA remedies for workers in other
areas. For example, the NLRB has drastically expanded the possible work duties that
would make a worker a “supervisory” employee and thus ineligible for union repre-
sentation. See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
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liable for FLSA violations.14 A growing chorus of worker-friendly
scholars and labor leaders, including AFL–CIO President Richard
Trumka, have advocated for the scrapping the NLRA and the
NLRB15 because of the NLRA’s perceived inability to assist workers
organize and because of the courts’ and the NLRB’s willingness to
use the NLRA to harm worker collective action. This Note con-
cludes with an argument that, despite these calls, recent case law,
the potentially pro-worker composition of an Obama NLRB, and
Congress’s consideration of the Employee Free Choice Act (a pro-
labor revision to the NLRA)16 all demonstrate that important
worker victories are still possible under the NLRA. Therefore the
NLRA and the NLRB should be preserved. Ideally, this Note will
assist creative advocates in identifying the windows of opportunity
that still exist in the NLRA, which, if litigated, can unleash the
power of the NLRA for workers’ collective interests.
I. HISTORY AND SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATIONS OF NLRA
When Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, it intended to af-
firmatively alter the power disparities between workers and employ-
ers to promote the free flow of commerce.17 It sought to do this by
legalizing and encouraging workers to have collective associa-
tions—just as employers had organized for years—to increase their
bargaining power.18 Thus, the NLRA states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
14 See, e.g., Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 Civ. 9033 (RJS), 2009
WL 1383488 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2009) (granting motion for liquidated damages based
on jury finding that manufacturer of garments produced by workers of contractor
liable for FLSA violations as a joint employer); see also Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty
Apparel Co., 556 F.Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying six joint employer factors
to deny defendant garment manufacturer’s summary judgment motion); Lopez v.
Silverman, 14 F.Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying a set of wide ranging factors
to find garment jobber was a joint employer of contractor’s employees) .
15 See, e.g., comments of AFL–CIO President Richard Trumka, infra text accompa-
nying note 151.
16 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009); see
also American Rights at Work, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/employee-free-
choice-act/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
17 NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
18 Id. (“The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organ-
ized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce . . . by depressing wage rates.”).
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designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutual aid or protection.19
Congress intended the NLRA and the NLRB to trump other fed-
eral statutes that operate in the area of labor relations and stated
that the NLRA was to be “‘paramount over other laws that might
touch upon similar subject matters’ in order to ‘dispel the confu-
sion resulting from dispersion of authority and to establish a single
paramount administrative or quasi-judicial authority in connection
with the development of the Federal American law regarding col-
lective bargaining.’”20
As legal scholar Jennifer Gordon observes, “decades of union
activism . . . set the stage for the negotiation of the rights enshrined
in the National Labor Relations Act.”21 The drafters of the NLRA
recognized that workers gain power through collective action—in-
dividual worker action is insufficient to fulfill the NLRA’s goal of
altering the power imbalances at the workplace.22 Therefore, the
core protections that the NLRA conveys to workers are the right to
collectively organize to demand better terms and conditions of em-
ployment and the right to engage in mutual aid and support.23
Some of the defining features of the NLRA include the identifica-
tion of a recognized union as the workers’ exclusive bargaining
representative,24 protections from discharge or other disciplinary
actions for workers attempting to form a union or to otherwise act
concertedly regarding the terms and conditions of employment,25
and protections from employer discrimination for union activity.26
When originally enacted, the NLRA prohibited only employers,
not workers’ representatives, from engaging in certain specified
“unfair labor practices.”27 Additionally, the NLRA originally al-
lowed “closed shops,” workplaces where union membership was re-
19 Id.
20 See Sachs, supra note 3, at 2685 n.1 (quoting S. REP. NO. 573, at 15 (1935),
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2315
(1949)).
21 JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 166 (2005).
22 See generally S. REP. NO. 573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 2315 (1949).
23 NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
24 NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006).
25 NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
26 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
27 NLRA § 8(a)(1)–(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)–(5) (2006). Congress later prohib-
ited workers’ representatives from committing certain unfair labor practices. See infra
text accompanying note 38.
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quired in order to get a job,28 and did not prohibit secondary
boycotts against “neutral” third parties. The NLRA was viewed by
many as a nod to the increasing political power of organized work-
ers, and a concrete step towards the balancing of workplace
strength between employers and workers, or at least white work-
ers.29 “The NLRA embodies rights that our forebears worked and
struggled for over many decades,”30 points out labor law professor
Ellen J. Dannin, and “the NLRA [expresses] values of democracy,
solidarity, social and economic justice, fairness, and equality.”31 In-
deed, the NLRA was seen as a monumental and sweeping act that
would establish the rules for an industrial democracy.32
This, of course, is not to say that the NLRA sailed through
Congress without a fight. Business-friendly congresspeople pro-
posed numerous failed amendments to the NLRA,33 but were able
to exclude agricultural workers and domestic workers from the def-
inition of “employee”34 on the argument that these workers were
too few in number in a single workplace to need collective repre-
sentation, and were too insignificant to affect interstate com-
merce.35 These categorical exclusions laid the groundwork for
Congress’s, the courts’, and the Board’s later additions to the list of
workers unable to enjoy statutory protections when attempting to
act collectively for improved workplace conditions.
The business class did not lay down its arms after the NLRA’s
passage. Just over a decade after passing the NLRA, Congress sig-
28 This closed shop status allowed workers in transient jobs such as waitressing and
construction to have their primary affiliation with the union and not with the em-
ployer. See GORDON, supra note 21, at 60. This was seen as a mechanism to increase
union bargaining power in those industries. See id. at 61. However, the NAACP and
other civil rights groups strongly opposed the closed shop system because most un-
ions at the time prevented Black workers from joining, and Black workers were thus
excluded from those workplaces. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL SYSTEM 104–05 (1977).
29 See generally HILL, supra note 28.
30 ELLEN J. DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW 16 (2006).
31 Id. at 166.
32 See generally Sachs, supra note 3, at 2685.
33 Dannin, supra note 9.
34 NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
35 79 Cong. Rec. 9720, 9720–21 (1935); North Whittier Heights Citrus Ass’n v.
NLRB, 109 F.2d 76, 80 (9th Cir. 1940) (“there never would be a great number suffer-
ing under the difficulty of negotiating with the actual employer and there would be
no need for collective bargaining and conditions leading to strikes would not ob-
tain”); Fred Witney, Agricultural Workers Under National Labor Relations Law, INST. OF
LAB. & INDUS. REL. BULL. (U. of Ill., Urbana–Champaign, Ill.) Series A, Vol. 2, Special,
Mar. 1948, available at http://www.archive.org/stream/agriculturalwork02witn/agri-
culturalwork02witn_djvu.txt.
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nificantly limited the NLRA’s strength because the NLRB was
viewed as too pro-union and infiltrated by communists.36  In 1947,
Congress betrayed the pro-union mandate of the NLRA and re-
sponded to political pressure from business and farm associations,
under the guise of anti-communism, by passing the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, commonly known as the Taft–Hartley Act.37
The Taft–Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things,
prohibiting unions, and not only employers, from engaging in un-
fair labor practices;38 eliminating the closed shop;39 excluding su-
pervisors and independent contractors from the definition of
protected “employees”;40 and prohibiting secondary boycotts
against “neutral” entities that were not part of a primary labor dis-
pute.41 The effects of the amendments were to limit the classes of
employees who could organize collectively and to outlaw important
economic weapons and organizing tools available to workers.42 As
labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein explains:
Taft–Hartley advocates saw the law as a proxy for a much larger
social and political project whose import extended well beyond
the recalibration of the “collective bargaining” mechanism. In-
deed, the Taft–Hartley law stands like a fulcrum upon which the
entire New Deal order teetered. Before 1947 it was possible to
imagine a continuing expansion and vitalization of the New
Deal impulse. After that date, however, labor and the left were
forced into an increasingly defensive posture.43
II. NLRB AND COURT RULINGS HAVE CONSTRICTED NLRA
PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS
Congress is not the only entity to limit worker protections and
narrow the definition of covered “employees” under the NLRA.
Courts and the NLRB have also severely reined in NLRA protec-
tions.44 As discussed in this Part, courts and the NLRB have re-
36 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS—THE STORY OF THE
NLRB 1935–1995, at 17 (1995), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/His-
tory/thhe_first_60_years.aspx.
37 Id. at 20.
38 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft–Hartley Act) (amending NLRA by
adding §8(b), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006)).
39 Id. at § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2006).
40 Id. at § 2(3), (11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11) (2006).
41 Id. at § 8(b)(4), (e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), (e) (2006).
42 DANNIN, supra note 30, at 15.
43 Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft–Hartley: A Slave–Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763,
765 (1998).
44 For example, within five years of the NLRA’s enactment, the courts had author-
ized employers to hire people to permanently replace strikers. NLRB v. Mackay Radio
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duced the classes of “employees” afforded the NLRA’s
protections;45 prevented many undocumented immigrant workers
from recovering back pay as a result of discharge for protected
union activity;46 denied temporary workers the right to organize a
union with their permanent coworkers;47 and hampered the en-
forcement of two doctrines that impose broader liability for NLRA
violations against workers (the joint employer doctrine48) and al-
low unions to pressure more categories of employers and associ-
ated entities (the ally doctrine49). In these ways, the courts and the
NLRB have perverted the NLRA’s original purpose—to redress the
power inequalities in the workplace—by narrowing the classes of
workers who are protected under the NLRA and allowing employ-
ers to pit workers against each other.
A. Narrowed Definition of NLRA-Covered “Employees”
In the 1974 decision NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Tex-
tron, Inc., the Supreme Court excluded “managerial” employees
from NLRA coverage.50 Managerial employees are defined as
“those who formulate and effectuate management policies by ex-
pressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.”51
Seven years later, in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Member-
ship Corp., the Court excluded “confidential” employees, defined as
“persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor
relations,” from NLRA coverage.52 Most recently, in Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., the Board expanded the possible work duties that
would make a worker a “supervisory” employee and thus ineligible
& Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938). This severely undermined the Act’s intent.
DANNIN, supra note 30, at 17.
45 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974)
(excluding “managerial” employees); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Mem-
bership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) (excluding “confidential” employees); Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006) (expanding duties defining an NLRA-ex-
empt “supervisory” employee).
46 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB (Hoffman Plastic), 535 U.S. 137
(2002); Sure–Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
47 Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004).
48 See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1983) (setting formalistic joint employer
standard).
49 SEIU Local 525 v. NLRB, 52 F. App’x 357 (9th Cir. 2002) (articulating strict
standard for when a union can target a secondary “allied” employer in an organizing
campaign).
50 Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. at 288.
51 Id. (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
52 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
180–81 (1981) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)).
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for union representation.53 These three decisions have acted as “ju-
dicial amendments” to the NLRA,54 limiting protections for wide
swaths of vulnerable workers and effectively prohibiting millions of
workers from organizing together for mutual aid.
B. Restrictive Definition of Workers Eligible for Remedies and Collective-
Bargaining Representation under NLRA: Undocumented
Immigrants and Temporary Workers
The past two and a half decades have witnessed a striking de-
cline in workers’ collective activity because of Supreme Court and
NLRB rulings limiting the types of workers who are protected and
entitled to the full panoply of remedies for employer abuses under
the NLRA. As demonstrated in this Part, two fast-growing catego-
ries of workers—undocumented immigrants and temporary work-
ers—now face serious obstacles in organizing collectively with their
documented and permanent coworkers.
1. Undocumented Immigrant Workers
The only two times that the Supreme Court has addressed the
rights of undocumented immigrant workers under the NLRA were
in rulings withholding NLRA remedies.55 The Court began in 1984
in Sure–Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, in which the Court, reversing the
NLRB’s decision, barred undocumented workers who had re-
turned to their country of origin from collecting back pay for the
time after having been illegally fired for protected union activity.56
The Court held that the workers were not “available” for work—a
requirement for back pay remedies—because they would be violat-
ing immigration laws if they were to return to the United States
without being legally admitted.57 Reinstatement with back pay, the
53 Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006).
54 Dannin, supra note 9 (expanding on the concept of “judicial amendments” to
the NLRA).
55 Sure–Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB (Hoffman Plastic), 535 U.S. 137 (2002); but see Dannin, supra note 9 (arguing
that Hoffman Plastic is only the latest in a line of Supreme Court “judicial amend-
ments” to the NLRA—starting with NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S.
240 (1939) (workers’ participation in sit-down strike precluded their ability to receive
NLRA remedies for employer’s unfair labor practices), and Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (sailors’ refusal to work, characterized as a “mutiny,” pre-
cluded their ability to receive NLRA remedies for employer’s unfair labor prac-
tices)—that deny NLRA remedies to workers found guilty of violating other federal or
state laws while attempting to exercise their NLRA right to protected concerted
activity).
56 Sure–Tan, 467 U.S. at 909.
57 Id. at 903.
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Court ruled, is conditioned on the ability to be “lawfully . . . present
and employed in the U.S.”58  Despite emphasizing that undocu-
mented workers are still covered as “employees” under the
NLRA,59 by restricting the remedies available to undocumented
workers, the Court effectively gave the green light to employers to
violate the rights of undocumented workers who had subsequently
left the United States, even if their departure directly resulted from
an employer-initiated immigration raid.
The Court rejected the NLRB’s ruling in Sure–Tan because,
while upholding the intentions of the NLRA, the Board’s ruling
would have required the worker to violate the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) by unlawfully reentering the country.60
However, when Congress passed the NLRA, it intended that the
NLRA would trump other statutory provisions applicable to the
area of labor relations.61 Congress also meant for the Board to ad-
minister the NLRA with only limited judicial review.62 By denying
otherwise eligible workers the remedy of back pay under the
NLRA, the Court ignored congressional intent in passing the
NLRA to encourage collective activity by all workers—modifying
the power imbalances at the workplace—and chose instead to re-
present the interests of employers.
The Court then dropped a bombshell when it released its deci-
sion in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, which virtually
eliminated the collective rights of undocumented workers under
the NLRA. In that case, the Court expanded its ruling in Sure–Tan
by denying reinstatement and back pay remedies to undocu-
mented workers who had been fired for protected union activity,
but had not left the United States.63 In 1986, Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), which, for the first
time, made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire persons to
work in the United States without proper work authorization.64
The Court used this law to expand the Sure–Tan holding. There-
fore, undocumented workers who had stayed in the United States
after being illegally fired on account of their union organizing ac-
58 Id.
59 Id. at 891.
60 Id. at 903–05.
61 See supra note 22.
62 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this, writing “[t]he exercise of the
[empiric] process [of administration] was committed to the Board, subject to limited
judicial review.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
63 Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. 137.
64 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2006).
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tivities were also “unavailable” for work, and were thus ineligible
for reinstatement and back pay for the time from which they were
unlawfully fired.65
Again, by favoring the IRCA and the INA over the NLRA,66 the
Court overlooked Congress’s original intent to have the NLRA be
“paramount over other laws that might touch upon similar subject
matters.”67 Instead of casting blame on the employer for violating
the NLRA by unlawfully firing the undocumented workers—still
considered “employees” under the NLRA—the Court blamed the
workers for violating the IRCA.68 Thus, the Court characterized it
as a case of an “innocent” employer who unknowingly hired un-
documented workers who knowingly and fraudulently presented
false documents to obtain employment. In his dissent, Justice
Breyer correctly recognized that having the IRCA trump the NLRA
actually undermines the IRCA’s express goals of preventing em-
ployer abuses of workers because it encourages employers to ex-
ploit undocumented workers even more  because they know that
they will not be held liable for reinstatement and back pay—two of
the NLRA’s most significant remedies—if they fire those workers
for union activity.69
Hoffman Plastic was a severe shock to the labor movement and
advocates for immigrant worker rights. “The Hoffman Plastics case
eviscerated undocumented immigrants’ right to organize,” argues
labor law professor Jennifer Gordon.70 “Now an employer who
notes that an undocumented worker is wearing a ‘Union Yes’ but-
ton, or has attended a single union meeting, can rest assured that if
he fires her he will never be fined a penny.”71 Indeed, the Court
sent a clear message that it will not protect collective action among
undocumented workers by punishing significantly an employer for
65 Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 145.
66 Id. at 149.
67 See S. REP. NO. 573 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935, at 2315 (1949); Dannin supra note 9 (“the Court has
created a special doctrine that allows this nation’s most basic labor law to be pre-
empted by other laws . . . when those other laws are the source for legal misdeeds by
employees”).
68 Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 148–49.
69 Id. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the
Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193,
195 (arguing that imposing employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers
distorts both labor and immigration law by providing an incentive for employers to
hire and exploit undocumented workers).
70 GORDON, supra note 21, at 51.
71 Id. The NLRA does not include a provision whereby an employer may be fined
for violating the Act.
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breaking the law. More importantly, in Sure–Tan and Hoffman
Plastic, the Court condoned employers’ dividing workers who share
a common interest along immigration lines, thus hurting all work-
ers. By denying one set of workers the full panoply of remedies, it
harms the rest of the workers and hinders collective action among
the working class.
2. Temporary Workers
In 2004, the NLRB further restricted the group of NLRA-cov-
ered workers in Oakwood Care Center.72 In that case, a union peti-
tioned for workers who were solely employed by Oakwood Care
Center, an assisted living facility, along with workers who were
jointly employed by Oakwood Care and a temporary staffing
agency, N&W, to be included in the same bargaining unit.73 The
Board found that permitting a combined unit of solely and jointly
employed employees, as the Board had previously done,74 contra-
vened section 9(b) of the NLRA by requiring different employers
to bargain together regarding employees in the same unit.75 The
Board held that “combined units of solely and jointly employed
employees are multiemployer units and are statutorily permissible
only with the parties’ consent.”76
This decision effectively prevents temporary workers—prod-
ucts of a relatively new trend of massive temporary employment—
from having a collective bargaining agreement because, while tem-
porary workers are still technically able to form unions, an em-
ployer of permanent workers such as Oakwood Care would likely
never consent to a multiemployer unit. Therefore, the temporary
workers would be forced to organize on their own, without the
strength of their permanent coworkers. This division of workers in
the same workplace would likely prevent the weaker temporary
workers from winning a collective bargaining agreement. In their
dissent, Board members Wilma Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh rec-
ognized this, writing,
The Board now effectively bars yet another group of employ-
ees—the sizeable number of workers in alternative work ar-
rangements—from organizing labor unions, by making them
get their employers’ permission first. That result is surely not
72 Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004).
73 Id. at 659.
74 See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000) (authorizing multiemployer bar-
gaining units).
75 Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 663.
76 Id. (emphasis added).
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what Congress envisioned when it instructed the Board, in de-
ciding whether a particular bargaining unit is appropriate, ‘to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by th[e] Act.’77
The dissent also correctly noted that the majority’s refusal to place
the workers in the same bargaining unit harms the permanent
workers employed directly by Oakwood Care because, when at-
tempting to organize for better wages and working conditions, they
can be pitted against the temporary workers who are barred from
organizing with them.78
These recent Supreme Court and NLRB decisions splinter
workers with common interests, further undermining the purposes
of the NLRA. While undocumented workers and temporary work-
ers are still covered “employees” under the NLRA, their practical
abilities to organize with their coworkers have been severely
limited.
C. Restrictive Definitions of Liable Employers and Employer-Associated
Entities Subject to Union Pressure under NLRA
In addition to reducing the classes of workers eligible for cer-
tain NLRA remedies, courts and the NLRB have limited the range
of employers liable for NLRA violations as well as the categories of
employers and associated entities that unions may legally pressure
during organizing campaigns. Specifically, the Board and the cir-
cuit courts of appeals have (1) shrunk the categories of employers
that can be held jointly responsible for NLRA violations (i.e. joint
employers),79 and (2) limited the application of the ally doctrine80
pursuant to which third parties can be found to be “allies” of an
employer in its anti-union campaign, and thus not protected by the
NLRA secondary boycott prohibition.81 These actions by the Board
and courts further divide workers and contravene the express in-
tent of the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining.
77 Id. at 663–64 (Liebman, M., and Walsh, M., dissenting) (quoting NLRA § 9(b),
29 U.S.C. §159(b)).
78 Id.
79 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002).
80 SEIU Local 525 v. NLRB, 52 F. App’x 357, 360 (9th Cir. 2002).
81 Unions sometimes attempt to pressure other entities associated with the primary
employer, so that those associated entities will in turn pressure the primary employer
to negotiate with the union. However, NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006),
known as the “secondary boycott” provision, prohibits a union from exerting such
pressure on a entity with which the union does not have a labor dispute.
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1. Joint Employer Doctrine
The NLRB has generally applied a narrow definition of “joint
employers,” limiting the types of de facto employers that can be
held liable for NLRA violations.82 In TLI, Inc.,83 the NLRB set the
current standard for determining joint employer status. The Board
wrote, “where two separate entities share or codetermine those
matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employ-
ment, they are to be considered joint employers for purposes of
the Act.”84 The Board added, “there must [also] be a showing that
the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the employ-
ment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision,
and direction.”85 In applying these relatively formalistic factors86
that recognize only direct and immediate employment relation-
ships, the Board has been explicit in rejecting the joint employer
test previous to TLI, which also recognized indirect employment
relationships.87
The narrow NLRA joint employer factors fail to take into ac-
count complex nontraditional forms of employment, especially in
the growing area of subcontracting. In a 1991 case, Southern Califor-
nia Gas Co., the NLRB affirmed an administrative law judge’s ruling
that a building management company that fired a union cleaning
contractor on account of anti-union animus was not liable for the
workers’ unlawful discharge because it was not a joint employer.88
Decisions like this have helped to give employers that subcontract
services immunity from liability for unfair labor practices commit-
ted against workers in union drives, tipping the playing field even
more in favor of employers.89
82 A common joint employer arrangement works as follows: an employer contracts
out services but effectively controls the terms and conditions of employment for the
contractor’s employees.
83 TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1983).
84 Id.
85 Id. (quoting Laerco Transportation & Warehouse, 268 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984));
Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597 n.1 (2002)).
86 The NLRA joint employer test is formalistic and narrow relative to the FLSA
joint employer test. See infra Part IV. While the NLRB has certainly recognized joint
employer status, and has at times applied other, more expansive factors sui generis, see
discussion of CNN America, Inc., infra Part V, the factors are unquestionably stricter
than those found in the FLSA test.
87 Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. at 597 n.1 (acknowledging Board’s rejection of
former joint employer standard found in, for example, Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B.
23 (1973), enforced, 491 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1974), and Jewel Smokeless Coal Corp.,
170 N.L.R.B. 392, 393 (1968), enforced, 435 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1970)).
88 S. Cal. Gas Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 456, 461 (1991).
89 See generally, Roger Waldinger, et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for
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2. Ally Doctrine
The ally doctrine is an exception to the NLRA secondary boy-
cott prohibition. Under the ally doctrine, an entity loses its NLRA
section 8(b)(4) secondary boycott protection as a neutral third
party when it enmeshes itself in anti-union activities against the pri-
mary employer’s workers.90 However, the federal courts have lim-
ited the classes of primary employers and associated entities that
may be susceptible to union pressure by narrowly interpreting the
ally doctrine. In SEIU Local 525 v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit held
that certain third parties cannot be held liable for anti-union activi-
ties as allies of employers.91 In that case, the union argued that the
landlords and tenants of a building whose cleaning contractor the
union was attempting to organize were allies of the contractor be-
cause they had enmeshed themselves in the labor dispute by ac-
tively supporting the contractor’s anti-union campaign.92 The
union thus posited that the landlord and tenants were not covered
by the prohibition against secondary pressures and that the union’s
picketing was not unlawfully targeting the landlord and tenants as
neutral third parties.93 The court, however, ruled that the landlord
and tenants were not the contractor’s allies because, under the ally
doctrine, the putative ally must either be performing struck work
for the primary employer or must “fall into the category of those
who, because of common ownership, control and integration of
operations, become so identified with the primary employer that
they are treated as a single enterprise.”94 These narrow factors are
similar to the formalistic factors for NLRA joint employment under
TLI, Inc., further demonstrating the refusal of the courts and the
Board to impose employer liability or allow unions to pressure em-
ployer-associated entities under the NLRA unless a very limited set
of factors are satisfied.
Because of the subsequent legislative distortions of the NLRA
and the federal court and NLRB limitations on the NLRA’s ability
to protect workers’ collective action, the NLRA and the NLRB no
longer accurately reflect Congress’s original intention to address
power imbalances in the workplace. Jennifer Gordon argues that
“interpreted against the interests of workers by generations of con-
Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles, 11–12 (Lewis Ctr. for Reg’l Policy Studies, Working
Paper No.15 Apr. 1996), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/15z8f64h.
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servative courts, and administered by a backlogged, hamstrung,
and sorely underfunded administrative agency,” the NLRA is no
longer “the manifesto for the right of workers to bargain collec-
tively envisioned by its pro-labor drafters and early supporters.”95
Employers seeking to maintain unilateral control over the work-
place have caused this systematic dismantling of the NLRA because
Congress drafted the NLRA to encourage workers to act together,
not individually, in support of their interests. And courts and the
Board have followed suit by individualizing the collective rights
enumerated in the NLRA, fundamentally distorting the NLRA’s
purposes.96 Despite Justice Thurgood Marshall’s proclamation that
“[t]hese are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to act in
concert with one’s fellow employees,”97 cases such as Sure–Tan,
Hoffman Plastic, Oakwood Care Center, TLI, Inc., Southern California
Gas, and SEIU Local 525 demonstrate a jurisprudence that divides
workers, which business interests welcome.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND SUBSEQUENT
MODIFICATIONS OF FLSA
As opposed to the NLRA, it appears that legislative and judi-
cial treatment of the FLSA still generally comports with the original
intention of Congress to establish a baseline of substantive wage
and hour protections for individual workers. Perhaps this is be-
cause the FLSA does not encourage workers to collectively alter the
power imbalances at the workplace, as does the NLRA.98  Powerful
business interests, therefore, have not viewed the FLSA with as
much hostility, and thus its protections of individual worker rights
95 GORDON, supra note 21, at 298.
96 Dannin, supra note 9 (citing Edward Scheunemann, The National Labor Relations
Act Versus the Courts, 11 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 135, 146 (1939)).
97 Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975).
98 Some scholars argue that the different treatments of the NLRA and the FLSA
can be explained by the statutes’ differing definitions of “employee” and by the differ-
ing types of remedies afforded by the NLRA and the FLSA. The FLSA broadly defines
an employee as anyone who “suffer[s] or [is] permit[ted] to work,” FLSA § 3, 29
U.S.C. 203(g) (2006), while the NLRA has a much narrower definition because of its
exclusions of several categories of workers, see supra Parts I and II, and by the fact that
FLSA remedies are retrospective (damages only) while NLRA remedies are prospec-
tive (reinstatement, back and front pay, etc). Author’s communication with Ellen J.
Dannin (Oct. 2009) (on file with author). However, the definitions of “employee” are
different precisely because Congress, the courts, and the NLRB have made them so,
arguably to preclude workers’ collective activity which business interests find more
threatening than individual worker attempts to vindicate substantive rights. As for
retrospective versus prospective relief, that is simply the nature of the statutes, and,
while courts may find it easier to only calculate and impose retrospective relief, it is
virtually impossible to do so while carrying out the purposes of the NLRA.
2009] WORKER UNITY AND THE LAW 123
are still enforced. In fact, FLSA rights have been expanded over
the years, partially because they can distract individual workers
from acting collectively to increase worker power.99 While the
NLRA contains procedural rights “essential to any effort to raise
wages and improve working conditions beyond the minimums pre-
scribed by law,” the FLSA contains substantive rights that “set basic
floors on workplace conditions.”100 Business interests figure that it
is less dangerous for individual workers to fight for minimum
rights that are already statutorily guaranteed than it is for workers
to fight collectively to co-determine, along with their employers,
the terms and conditions of their employment. This is not to say
that employers have not fought vigorously against FLSA protec-
tions—they have.101 However, relatively speaking, employers are
more comfortable with the FLSA than with the NLRA.102
Nowhere in the preamble of the FLSA does Congress state an
intention, as it does in the NLRA, to encourage workers to act col-
lectively to address the inequities in the workplace.103 Instead, the
congressional intent was to address “labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,” and to
support the “free flow of goods in commerce” by preventing labor
99 James Brudney, The Changing Workplace: Reflections on Group Action and the Law of
the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (1996); see also GORDON, supra note 21, at
170.
100 GORDON, supra note 21, at 152.
101 For example, spurred by the business lobby, the Department of Labor promul-
gated regulations in 2004 that broaden the definition of “professional” workers ex-
empted from FLSA coverage. 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22260 (Apr. 23, 2004) (codified at
29 C.F.R. §§ 541.300–304 (2009)). Furthermore, pro-business groups kept Congress
from raising the minimum wage for ten years, from 1996 until 2007. FLSA Amend-
ments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–88, 110 Stat. 1929; Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No.110–28, 121 Stat. 188. Even still, today’s minimum wage is nothing close to
a living wage. And the business lobby has hotly challenged the joint employer doc-
trine under the FLSA. See infra Part IV(B).
102 For example, Republicans and big businesses are fiercely resisting the Employee
Free Choice Act (EFCA), an act that would substantially increase NLRA rights for
workers attempting to unionize. See, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, REUTERS, Now Playing:
The Employee Free Choice Act (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?arti-
cleId=USTRE53S67T20090429 (writing that big business has “staged aggressive pub-
licity campaigns to win public support” and that the EFCA “makes [big business’s]
blood boil”); see also Sam Stein, HUFFINGTON POST, Cheney Whacks EFCA, Labor Welcomes
Him as a Spokesman (May 12, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/12/
cheney-whacks-efca-labor_n_202611.html (calling the EFCA “one of the GOP’s big-
gest rallying cries”). See generally Ctr. for Union Facts, http://www.UnionFacts.com
(last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
103 See NLRA §1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
124 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:107
disputes.104 These are all ideals that most people can support, if
not morally, then at least on a model of economic efficiency—well-
treated workers are more productive and well-paid workers spend
more money to boost the national economy. Significantly, the
FLSA does not seek to empower workers to address the power im-
balances that lead to exploitation in the first place.
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 with the support of un-
ions, child advocates, and other parts of civil society.105 Much of
the focus of the FLSA was on eliminating child labor and the unfair
competition that Southern employers gave Northern employers be-
cause of the dearth of wage and hour regulations in the South.106
Getting a fair labor bill passed despite the opposition of the con-
servative anti-New Deal Supreme Court was also a personal goal of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.107 The final version of the FLSA,
passed in 1938, applied to only about one-fifth of the labor
force.108 It banned oppressive child labor and set a minimum
hourly wage of 25 cents and a maximum workweek of 44 hours.109
It is worth noting that the FLSA originally excluded many groups
of workers, including employees of certain retail establishments,110
employees of common air carriers,111 all agricultural workers,112
bus drivers and other trolley and bus company employees,113 and
food packing and dairy workers114 from minimum wage and over-
time pay regulations.
As opposed to its treatment of the NLRA, Congress has gener-
ally expanded and extended FLSA protections to individual work-
ers over the years. While the FLSA originally excluded more
categories of workers than the NLRA, the statutes have now
switched, with the NLRA now excluding more types of workers
than the FLSA. Congress has repealed all of the worker exclusions
in the FLSA except for those dealing with certain farm workers.115
104 FLSA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
105 Jonathan Grossman, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maxi-











115 In 1966 and again in 1983, Congress extended FLSA coverage to certain classes
of farm workers. FLSA Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–601, 80 Stat. 830, 838
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In 1966, Congress extended FLSA coverage to workers in public
schools, nursing homes, laundries, and the entire construction in-
dustry.116 In 1974, domestic workers obtained coverage under the
FLSA, as did all state and local government employees.117 Congress
also added the “hot goods” provision to the FLSA, making it illegal
to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell any
goods produced in violation of minimum wage or overtime pay
laws.118 Despite the general trend of expanding FLSA coverage
over the years, Congress and the Department of Labor have also
restricted it for certain groups of workers.119 Furthermore, Con-
gress has only voted to raise the minimum wage nine times since
the FLSA’s enactment in 1938.120 But while the FLSA has been no
panacea for workers’ rights, it has remained relatively true to Con-
gress’s original intention of providing a baseline of substantive
workplace rights, especially when compared to the NLRA.
IV. SIGNIFICANT COURT RULINGS HAVE EXPANDED
APPLICATION OF FLSA
Federal courts have also generally augmented FLSA remedies
for workers and have expanded the classes of employers liable
under the FLSA. As described in this Part, courts have expressly
ruled that undocumented immigrant workers are eligible for FLSA
remedies, as opposed to NLRA remedies. And courts have liberally
applied the joint employer doctrine under the FLSA, while restrict-
ing its application under the NLRA.
(1966); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA), Pub. L.
No. 97–470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983).
116 FLSA Amendments of 1966, Pub. L No. 89–601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966).
117 FLSA Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93–259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (this was the
first time certain domestic workers were expressly included under FLSA coverage).
118 FLSA § 15(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (2006).
119 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, supra note 117, 88 Stat. at
62 (codified as amended at FLSA § 13(a)(15), (b)(21), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15),
(b)(21) (2006)) (exempting companionship workers from minimum wage and over-
time pay requirements and exempting live-in domestic workers from overtime pay
requirements, respectively); 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22260, supra note 101 (recategoriz-
ing workers by pulling professional workers out from under the protections of the
FLSA).
120 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law, http://www.
dol.gov/whd/minwage/coverage.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). Congress, through
various amendments, has voted to raise the minimum wage nine times. Some of those
individual amendments, however, incorporated several prescribed raises over a span
of years. Id.
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A. Undocumented Immigrant Workers Eligible for FLSA Remedies
As opposed to remedies prescribed by the NLRA, courts have
almost always upheld FLSA remedies for workers regardless of
their immigration status.121 The Hoffman Plastic holding denying
back pay remedies to undocumented workers has been limited to
cases adjudicated under the NLRA, despite early fears that it may
be applied to other statutes.122 In a 2002 case, Flores v. Amigon,123
the Eastern District of New York ruled that immigration status is
not relevant to a FLSA claim for unpaid wages for work that a
bakery worker had already performed. The court reasoned that
“unlike the problem posed in Hoffman Plastic in which an illegal
alien was wrongfully terminated from employment and could not
be legally reinstated, . . .  here no such impediment exists to repay-
ment of any amounts proved to be owed to plaintiff for work that
she already performed.”124 This holding typifies federal courts’ will-
ingness to recognize undocumented workers as eligible for reme-
dies under the FLSA.125
B. Expansive Definition of Employers Held Liable under FLSA: Joint
Employers
In contrast to the narrowing of the classes of employers held
liable for NLRA violations, courts have expanded the types of em-
ployers governed under the FLSA. Specifically, courts have applied
121 GORDON, supra note 21, at 310 n.19; see also Zheng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l,
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that workers’ immigration status
not relevant to FLSA claims that they had been illegally underpaid for work per-
formed); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053,
1056 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“There is no question that the protections provided by the
FLSA apply to undocumented aliens.”); Patel v. Quality Inn So., 846 F.2d, 700, 704
(11th Cir. 1988) (“FLSA’s coverage of undocumented aliens goes hand in hand with
the policies behind the IRCA. . . . If the FLSA did not cover undocumented aliens,
employers would have an incentive to hire them.”) (emphasis in original); Flores v.
Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX),  2002 WL 1163623 at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
9, 2002) (“[f]ederal courts are clear that the protections of the FLSA are available to
citizens and undocumented workers alike.”); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462,
462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Numerous lower courts have held that all employees, regard-
less of their immigration status, are protected by the provisions of the FLSA.”).
122 GORDON, supra note 21, at 310 n.19.
123 Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
124 Id. at 464.
125 See, e.g., supra note 121. While the difference in treatment of undocumented
immigrant workers could be explained by the FLSA’s imposition of retrospective rem-
edies, as opposed to the NLRA’s prospective remedies, there is nothing precluding
the expansion of the Supreme Court’s Hoffman Plastic reasoning to the FLSA—that
when a worker violates a federal or state law while exercising her workplace rights, she
may no longer enjoy remedies for violations of those workplace rights.
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more expansive definitions of joint employers under the FLSA.
While the courts are still struggling with this area of law and have
not spoken with certainty regarding when to hold contracting em-
ployers jointly liable for FLSA violations, they have been willing to
progress further in this area under the FLSA than under the
NLRA.
In many industries such as the garment industry, a system of
contracting exists where manufacturers—typically well-known
brands—contract out the production of their goods to avoid re-
sponsibility for the labor-intensive assembly stage of production.126
In the garment industry, the manufacturers dictate to the contrac-
tors the price per piece, the turnover time for the items, and the
exact specifications of the finished products.127 Often, the contrac-
tors—usually small, family-run operations—violate FLSA wage and
hour laws, then close up and disappear, leaving large groups of
unpaid or underpaid workers.128 The manufacturers then disclaim
responsibility for the FLSA violations committed by the contrac-
tors.129 In response, and in contrast to the shrinking employer cov-
erage under the NLRA,130 courts have expanded the FLSA’s
definition of joint employers to impose liability on the manufactur-
ers for violations committed against the workers by the contractors.
Although it has a long history in the agricultural industry,131
the FLSA joint employer doctrine has only recently been applied in
other areas. Its first application in the garment industry was a 1998
case, Lopez v. Silverman,132 in which the court applied a set of wide-
reaching factors to determine whether joint employer status ex-
isted under the FLSA.133
126 See Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweat-
shop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 293, 299–300 (2003); see also Laura Ho
et al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human
Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 385–86 (1996).
127 Lung, supra note 126, at 301.
128 Id. at 302 n.89, 305.
129 Id. at 294.
130 However, the NLRA does extend employer coverage to manufacturers in the
garment industry by exempting unions from liability for secondary boycotts of manu-
facturers during a labor dispute with a contractor. See NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (2006).
131 See generally Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
132 Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
133 The factors were:
(1) the extent to which the workers perform a discrete line-job forming
an integral part of the putative joint employer’s integrated process of
production or overall business objective; (2) whether the putative joint
employer’s premises and equipment were used for the work; (3) the
extent of the putative employees’ work for the putative joint employer;
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A year later began the decade-long saga of Ling Nan Zheng v.
Liberty Apparel, where 26 garment workers sued a garment manufac-
turer for FLSA violations committed by the contractor.134 The case
was appealed to the Second Circuit, which rejected a formalistic
approach to the employment relationship—the analysis that courts
and the NLRB embrace in determining joint employer status
under the NLRA—when determining whether an entity is a joint
employer under the FLSA.135 The court wrote, “[t]he broad lan-
guage of the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . demands that a district
court look beyond an entity’s formal right to control the physical
performance of another’s work before declaring that the entity is
not an employer under the FLSA.”136 The court found the four
narrow factors establishing a formal employment relationship137 to
be sufficient but not essential in finding joint employer status.138 It
then named a set of six factors139—factors narrower than those
named in Lopez but still expansive compared to the formalistic joint
employer standard under the NLRA—to determine joint employer
(4) the permanence or duration of the working relationship between
the workers and the putative joint employer; (5) the degree of control
exercised by the putative joint employer over the workers; (6) whether
responsibility under the contract with the putative joint employer
passed “without material changes” from one group of potential joint
employees to another; and (7) whether the workers had a “business or-
ganization” that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint em-
ployer to another.
Id. at 419–20.
134 Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 Civ. 9033 (RCC), 2002 WL
398663 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2002).
135 Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003).
136 Id.
137 These factors were whether the entity:
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) supervised and
controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3)
determined the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintained em-
ployment records.
Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984).
138 Ling Nan Zheng, 355 F.3d at 64.
139 The six factors were:
(1) whether [the putative joint employer’s] premises and equipment
were used for the plaintiffs’ work; (2) whether the [contractor] had a
business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint em-
ployer to another; (3) the extent to which plaintiffs performed a dis-
crete line-job that was integral to [the putative joint employer’s] process
of production; (4) whether responsibility under the contracts could pass
from one subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the
degree to which [the putative joint employer] or their agents supervised
plaintiffs’ work; and (6) whether plaintiffs worked exclusively or
predominantly for [the putative joint employer].
Id. at 72.
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status. The court also stated that additional factors could be ap-
plied on an ad hoc basis according to the particular facts presented
in a case.140
In early 2009, the Southern District of New York denied a mo-
tion to set aside a jury award for garment workers, holding that
Liberty Apparel, the manufacturer, was a joint employer and thus
jointly liable for the FLSA violations committed by its contrac-
tors.141 This groundbreaking outcome will likely lead to the further
expansion of the joint employer doctrine under the FLSA.
As demonstrated by the above analysis, Congress and courts
have generally upheld or expanded FLSA coverage of workers and
of employers. Meanwhile, they have reduced NLRA protections for
workers and liabilities for employers. It is likely that this conflicting
application of the two statutory regimes is due to the fact that the
FLSA does not seek to challenge the power imbalance at the work-
place that underlies the market economy.
V. NLRA STILL CONTAINS SEEDS OF PROMISE
Despite the systematic dismantling of the NLRA over the years
and suggestions that the NLRA is impotent or even anti-worker,142
the NLRA is still a powerful statutory regime supporting worker
unity and collective action, as demonstrated by recent court and
Board decisions.143 Additionally, President Barack Obama has ap-
pointed a pro-labor majority to the Board144 and Congress is con-
sidering the Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”),145 a proposed
overhaul of the NLRA that would strengthen its ability to promote
worker unity.146 As former Board Member Dennis P. Walsh has
written, “[t]he National Labor Relations Act and the Board that
140 Id. at 71–72.
141 Ling Nan Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., No. 99 Civ. 9033 (RJS), 2009 WL
1383488, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2009).
142 See generally Sachs, supra note 3 (arguing that the NLRA has become a tool used
against worker organizing).
143 All Board decisions by a two-Member Board from January 1, 2008 to the time of
this Note’s publication have been disputed, and as of the publication of this Note, the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the validity of those decisions. However, it has
granted certiorari on the issue in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 488 (2009). Sam Hananel, Associated Press, Justice Asks
High Court to OK Labor Board Rulings (Sep. 29, 2009) (LEXIS).
144 President Obama appointed Craig Becker, a union attorney, and Mark Pearce, a
labor-side employment law attorney, to the Board. He also appointed existing pro-
union Board member Wilma Liebman to Chair. Greenhouse, supra note 7.
145 H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
146 See generally American Rights at Work, supra note 16. (“The legislation would
give workers a fair and direct path to form unions through majority sign-up, help
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administer[s] it remain the preeminent source of protection for
workers who desire to work together to improve their working con-
ditions and engage in the process of collective bargaining.”147 Even
during the anti-union George W. Bush presidency, some NLRB de-
cisions and federal court rulings planted the seeds that will en-
hance unity at the workplace, rather than enshrine divisions
between workers.148 These developments indicate that the NLRA is
still a potential force for worker unity and point to the possibility
that the NLRA will truly reflect Congress’s intent of “encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for the pur-
pose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”149
Some advocates, scholars, and labor leaders argue that work-
ers should avoid the NLRA altogether, and instead, look to other
statutes like the FLSA150 or outside the law completely to seek pro-
tections while acting collectively to improve workplace conditions.
AFL–CIO President Richard Trumka has called the NLRB “clini-
cally dead” and told Congress, “I say abolish the Act. Abolish the
affirmative protections of labor that it promises but does not de-
liver. . .. Deregulate.”151 Former ACORN head Wade Rathke ac-
cused the NLRB of being “complicit with employers.”152 NLRA
abstentionists such as law professor Benjamin I. Sachs back up
these claims by pointing to examples of recent successful organiz-
ing campaigns that circumvented the NLRA process altogether.153
The allegations of the aggressive attacks on union rights are
true. But the NLRA is not to blame. Instead, the attacks are prod-
ucts of decades of reactionary court and Board interpretations of
the NLRA, “pervert[ing] the express language of the law.”154 Ellen
J. Dannin advocates for a NAACP Legal Defense Fund-style long
term litigation campaign to reverse anti-worker precedent.155 The
employees secure a contract with their employer in a reasonable period of time, and
toughen penalties against employers who violate their workers’ rights.”).
147 Posting of Dennis P. Walsh to Sage House News: The Cornell University Press
Blog, Dennis Walsh on Taking Back the Workers’ Law, http://cornellpress.wordpress.
com/2008/08/04/dennis-walsh-on-taking-back-the-workers-law/ (Aug. 4, 2008, 10:09
EST).
148 See infra notes 167–209 and accompanying text.
149 NLRA §1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
150 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 3, at 2687 (arguing that the FLSA should replace the
NLRA as the statute of choice for workers who seek to organize because of the
NLRA’s inefficacy).
151 DANNIN, supra note 30, at 5.
152 Id. at 4.
153 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. 375 (2007).
154 DANNIN, supra note 30, at 5.
155 Id. at 3.
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possibility of using creative legal strategies to improve the applica-
tion of the NLRA demonstrates that the NLRA is worth saving. Af-
ter all, as labor scholar Anne Marie Lofaso has noted the NLRA
still holds
[p]rimary and oftentimes exclusive jurisdiction over la-
bor–management disputes, and an anti-union Board can create
rules that force the parties to use its processes and then stack
those rules in favor of de-collectivization. . . . While true libera-
tion of workers might largely come through economic and polit-
ical channels, we ignore the courts and administrative agencies
at our own peril.156
Political intervention is a powerful way to manipulate the
NLRA’s effectiveness. President Ronald Reagan turned the once
politically-neutral NLRB into a partisan machine advocating his
strong anti-union position.157 As Ellen J. Dannin writes, “Reagan
began the practice of appointing Board members whose mission
was to destroy the agency.”158 In appointing Service Employees In-
ternational Union (“SEIU”) Associate General Counsel Craig
Becker and union-side labor lawyer Mark Pearce to the NLRB,
President Barack Obama has sought to restore a pro-union major-
ity on the Board, which could reverse many of the harsh anti-union
Board rulings during the George W. Bush presidency.159 Labor ad-
vocates also hope President Obama will provide the NLRB with ad-
equate funds to carry out its mission—something that has not
happened for decades.160 And union leaders are pushing for pas-
sage of the EFCA. While the EFCA’s “card check” provision161—
156 Anne Marie Lofaso, September Massacre: The Latest Battle in the War on Workers’
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, (American Constitution Soc’y for Law and
Pol’y, Washington, D.C.) May 2008, at 14–15, available at http://www.acslaw.org/
files/ACS%20September%20Massacre.pdf.
157 The NLRB was originally seen as an adjudicatory body with the purpose of fur-
thering the pro-labor goals of the NLRA. Presidential nominations to the Board were
made with this understanding. However, President Eisenhower abolished this tradi-
tion by appointing members to ensure a 3-2 Republican majority.  The 5-member
Board was thus turned into a partisan sounding board on the current administration’s
labor policy, and it has remained that way to this day.  President Reagan used this 3-2
split to turn the Board into a blatant anti-union body. Posting of Ellen J. Dannin to
Working Life blog, A New Agenda for the Obama NLRB, http://www.workinglife.org/
blogs/view_post.php?content_id=11524&highlight=partisan (Jan. 28, 2009).
158 Id.
159 Melanie Trottman, Unions Look to Labor Board to Reverse Bush Policy, WALL ST. J.,
June 3, 2009, at A2.
160 Noting the starving of the NLRB, Ellen J. Dannin writes, “Congress has so se-
verely restricted NLRB budgets that . . . [there now exists] a severe backlog of cases.”
DANNIN, supra note 30, at 8.
161 H.R. 1409, S. 560 § 2(a), 111th Cong. (2009). The term “card check” refers to a
procedure by which an employer is required to recognize a union as its employees’
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one of the bill’s central features—has attracted the most vehement
opposition by business interests and may not survive,162 the bill also
includes binding arbitration for union contracts,163 and could
eventually include prohibitions on employer “captive audience”
meetings164 and mandated union organizer access to worksites.165
All of these features would serve as counterbalances to Congress’s
anti-union modifications to the NLRA in decades past.
Despite their optimism, labor advocates cannot rely solely on
the promise of a worker-friendly NLRB and a pro-union overhaul
of the NLRA. Even under the Obama administration and with a
Democratic majority in both houses of Congress, unions have not
authorized representative when a simple majority of its employees sign cards authoriz-
ing the union to serve as the employees’ exclusive representative. Currently, an em-
ployer is not required to recognize a union when presented with authorization cards
signed by a majority of its employees; instead, it may request a secret ballot union
election. Such a secret ballot election gives an employer time to campaign against the
union, oftentimes by threatening employees with termination or plant closure if the
union wins. See GORDON LAFER, AM. RTS. AT WORK, FREE AND FAIR? HOW LABOR LAW
FAILS U.S. DEMOCRATIC ELECTION STANDARDS (2005), available at http://www.ameri-
canrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf.
162 Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2009, at A1. However, even if card check authorization is excluded from the
EFCA, some argue that the NLRB could singlehandedly mandate card check recogni-
tion. According to former NLRB Chairman William Gould, the NLRB could reverse
its previous recommendation to the Supreme Court to require a secret ballot election
if an employer so insists. Since the Court relied on the Board’s expertise in deciding
in 1974 that an employer does not have to recognize a union even if a majority of the
employees present signed union authorization cards, Linden Lumber Div., Summer &
Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974), the Board could acquire new expertise by examin-
ing new evidence and facts to determine that card check recognition is more appro-
priate than an election. Mark Schoeff Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a
Reality, WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT, July 2009, available at http://www.workforce.com/
section/03/feature/26/52/97/265299.html.
163 H.R. 1409, S. 560 § 3, 111th Cong. (2009). The binding arbitration provision of
the EFCA would expedite the collective bargaining process by forcing employers and
unions to go to arbitration if they cannot agree on a contract on their own within a
reasonable time period. See American Rights at Work, Union Contract Arbitration in
the United States and Canada: How Arbitration Encourages Contract Settlement,
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/contract_arbi-
tration_in_us_and_canada.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
164 The term “captive audience meeting” refers to a mandatory meeting held to
oppose a union campaign during which an employer typically inundates employees
with anti-union propaganda. See American Rights at Work, Unionbusters 101, http://
www.americanrightsatwork.org/the-anti-union-network/for-profit-union-busters/
unionbusters-101.html  (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). An employer may choose to hold
as many of these meetings as it wishes (except for the 24 hour period before the
union authorization election administered by the NLRB). See Frito–Lay, Inc., 341
N.L.R.B. 515 (2004); Blue Cross of Kansas City, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 483 (1981).
165 Holly Rosenkrantz, Specter to Support Senate Vote on Pro-Union Bill in Reversal,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=206010
87&sid=AJE3hnG29Ljo; Greenhouse, supra note 162.
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been able to muster the power to push through the EFCA.166 Until
unions can rebuild their political clout by organizing more of the
country’s labor force, they will need to explore other strategies—
including legal strategies—to enhance workers’ collective bargain-
ing rights. Specifically, union-side lawyers should attempt to ex-
pand the applications of pro-labor rulings to support new worker
organizing.
Recent decisions by federal and state courts, and even by the
NLRB during the George W. Bush presidency, have upheld NLRA
protections for workers and have ruled against employers seeking
to pit workers against one another. These decisions supporting
worker unity, while relatively few in number, indicate a pro-union
trend that a new Board under the Obama administration will likely
reinforce. This trend demonstrates that the NLRA, despite its dis-
mantling over the years, can still provide concrete support for
workers who wish to organize collectively, and the NLRA should
not be scrapped.
A. Certain Undocumented Immigrant Workers Still Eligible for
Remedies under NLRA
Despite the breadth of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hoffman
Plastic, courts and NLRB administrative law judges (“ALJs”) have
ruled that undocumented immigrant workers are eligible for back
pay remedies in certain situations based on discharge or discipline
for engaging in protected union activity. In NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel,
which predates Hoffman Plastic but arguably remains good law,167
the Second Circuit found that where an employer knowingly hired
undocumented employees—as opposed to one who unknowingly
hired undocumented workers as was the case in Hoffman Plastic—
and subsequently illegally terminated them for engaging in union
activity, the employees could collect back pay remedies.168 In his
dissent in Hoffman Plastic, Justice Breyer acknowledged this distinc-
tion, writing:
166 Much of organized labor’s inability to push through the card check provision
can be blamed on union infighting. A spell of union factionalization, the extent to
which has not been seen in decades, has pulled much of organized labor away from its
unified legislative priorities. See Steven Greenhouse, Infighting Distracts Unions at Cru-
cial Time, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2009, at B1.
167 See Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., No. 29-CA-25476, 2006 WL 3196754, *9
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 1, 2006) (“Hoffman did not disturb the conditional rein-
statement part of the order in A.P.R.A., . . . in which the employer . . . hired employ-
ees knowing that they were undocumented . . . . ”) (on appeal).
168 NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Were the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a knowing
employer—a circumstance not before us today . . . —this per-
verse economic incentive [to hire undocumented workers],
which runs directly contrary to the immigration statute’s basic
objective, would be obvious and serious.169
Soon after the Hoffman Plastic ruling, the General Counsel of
the NLRB clarified that it would still seek to enforce back pay rem-
edies for undocumented workers where the situations differ from
those in Hoffman Plastic.170 Additionally, in Mezonos Maven Bakery, a
2006 NLRB ALJ ruling, the judge reinforced the knowing em-
ployer distinction and granted undocumented workers back pay
for NLRA violations committed by their employer who hired the
workers knowing they were undocumented.171 Relying on this deci-
sion, another ALJ ruled a year later in Handyfat Trading that nine
unlawfully fired undocumented workers were entitled to back pay
because the employer knew the workers were undocumented im-
migrants when it hired them.172 Even the George W. Bush-ap-
pointed NLRB General Counsel Ronald Meisburg stated in 2007
that the Supreme Court “did not directly address whether undocu-
mented discriminatees could be entitled to back pay where no
fraud was committed by those discriminatees.”173 He emphasized
that the denial of back pay in Hoffman Plastic is “limited to em-
ployees who had defrauded their employers” by knowingly present-
ing false documents in violation of the IRCA.174
Though the Mezonos Maven Bakery and Handyfat Trading deci-
sions have both been appealed, the knowing employer distinction
recognized by Justice Breyer, the A.P.R.A. Fuel court, and General
Counsel Meisburg still gives hope to some undocumented workers
that they will enjoy meaningful NLRB protections when organizing
collectively. In addition, other recent decisions by the NLRB and
courts have granted conditional and non-conditional back pay
169 Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 02-06
(July 19, 2002), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2002/
gc02-06.html.
171 Id.
172 Handyfat Trading, Inc., No. 29-CA-28181, 2007 WL 2371977 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Aug. 14, 2007) (on appeal).
173 NLRB General Counsel Meisberg speaking before ABA Section of Labor and
Employment Law, posting of Jeffrey M. Hirsch to Workplace Prof Blog, General Coun-
sel Meisburg Discusses NLRBU Dispute, Backpay to Undocumented Workers, http://law
professors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2007/11/general-counsel.html (Nov. 15,
2007) (quoting BNA Daily Labor Report).
174 Id.
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remedies and lost wages to undocumented workers.175
B. Recent Court & NLRB Decisions Rebuff Employer Attempts to
Divide Workers using NLRA
Despite their occurring during possibly the worst decade for
labor rights since the enactment of the NLRA, several recent fed-
eral court and NLRB decisions have promoted worker unity, up-
holding the pro-collective action policies of the NLRA. In 2008, the
D.C. Circuit upheld a NLRB ruling to unite workers under the
same “community of interest,” despite the employer’s attempt to
pit the workers against each other.176 In Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB,
the employer argued that (1) undocumented immigrant workers
are not covered “employees” under Hoffman Plastic, and (2) its doc-
umented and undocumented workers should be in separate bar-
gaining units because they do not share the same “community of
interest.”177 The court rejected both claims outright, writing that
Hoffman Plastic does allow undocumented workers to be covered
“employees” and that the workers shared the same community of
interest because they received the same wages and benefits, faced
the same working conditions, answered to the same supervisors,
and possessed the same skills and duties.178 The court stated that
“[t]he community of interests test turns ‘on the interests of em-
ployees as employees, not their interests more generally.’”179 Even
the Republican-controlled NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling that the
workers shared the same community of interest.180 This decision is
significant because it rebuffs a serious attempt by an employer to
divide workers and demonstrates that pro-worker-unity decisions
are still possible under the NLRA.
Along the same lines, the Oakwood Care Center dissent, dis-
cussed in Part II, calls for the inclusion of solely and jointly em-
175 See Tuv Taam Corp., 340 N.L.R.B. 756 (2003) (conditional back pay award
granted; immigration status not relevant at merits stage of case, only at compliance
stage); see also Balbuena v. IDR Realty L.L.C., 845 N.E.2d 1246 (2006) (undocu-
mented immigrant workers who were injured and did not tender false documents not
barred under IRCA from receiving lost wages, i.e., past wages from time of accident
until verdict and future loss of earnings, under New York tort law).
176 Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’g Agri Processor
Co., 347 N.L.R.B. 1200 (Aug. 31, 2006), cert. denied, Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 129 S.
Ct. 594 (2008).
177 Id. at 3–4, 9 (company argued that allowing undocumented workers to vote in
union election would dilute the votes of the documented workers, proving they do
not share same community of interest).
178 Id. at 9.
179 Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
180 Id. at 3.
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ployed workers in the same bargaining unit because they share the
same “community of interest.”181 Particularly persuasive is the dis-
sent’s acknowledgment that combining jointly with solely em-
ployed employees in the same bargaining unit—recognizing their
shared community of interest—is highly rational, given that more
and more employees work in “alternative work arrangements.”182
Now that Member Liebman, co-author of the dissent, chairs the
Board, her analysis has a better chance of commanding a majority
of the Board, and the workers in “alternative work arrange-
ments”—including temporary and part-time workers—may rightly
be placed in the same bargaining unit as their full-time sisters and
brothers. Again, this shows that the NLRB can still interpret the
NLRA properly and deny employers’ attempts to create lines of di-
vision between workers.
Also in 2008, the Sixth Circuit overturned a decision by the
NLRB attempting to divide workers by denying NLRA protections
for concerted activity. In Jolliff v. NLRB,183 a group of truck drivers
was fired after writing a letter to corporate officers and a major
customer of the company complaining of regional managers’ de-
mands that the drivers “fix” their logbooks.184 The NLRA ruled
that such accusations were “maliciously false,” and the workers
therefore lost NLRA protection for their concerted activity.185
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that there was no mal-
ice in the workers’ accusations, and remanding the case to deter-
mine if the letter was protected collective activity.186 On remand,
the Board found the firings to have occurred in violation of NLRA
section 8(a)(1).187
The Seventh Circuit also reversed a Board ruling that sought
to divide workers by allowing an employer to lock out its striking
workers who had unilaterally agreed to end the strike, while per-
mitting the non-strikers to work.188 In Local 15, International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, the court ruled that the employer,
Midwest Generation, had improperly discriminated against union
181 Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 664–65 (Liebman, M., and Walsh, M.,
dissenting).
182 Id. at 665.
183 Jolliff v. NLRB, 513 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2008).
184 Id. at 602–06.
185 TNT Logistics N. America, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 568, 570 (2006).
186 Jolliff, 513 F.3d at 617.
187 TNT Logistics N. America, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 2008 WL 4763505 (Oct.
30, 2008).
188 Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB (Midwest Generation), 429 F.3d
651 (7th Cir. 2005).
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activity by maintaining its partial lockout after the strikers agreed
to return to work, and had failed to show that it had a legitimate
and substantial business justification for the partial lockout.189
Once again, a court ruled against an employer’s attempt to pit
workers against each other by maintaining a lockout against some
workers but not others.
With respect to the NLRA’s rigid joint employer standard, a
2008 ALJ decision has indicated that the standard may be becom-
ing more flexible and practical. In CNN America, Inc.,190 an ALJ de-
termined that CNN was a joint employer of a group of camera
operators and technicians, who were directly employed by Team
Video Services, L.L.C. While recognizing the controlling joint em-
ployer standard from TLI, Inc., the ALJ wrote, “[i]n practice, Board
decisions do not provide a bright line for determining when a joint
employer relationship exists. Each case is pretty much sui generis
and requires consideration of numerous factors.”191 The ALJ then
proceeded to apply factors such as (1) whether the work per-
formed involved the core of the putative joint employer’s busi-
ness,192 (2) whether the putative joint employer was effectively the
only source from which the direct employer could draw upon to
compensate its employees,193 (3) whether the putative joint em-
ployer had to give approval before the direct employer could as-
sign overtime hours,194 (4) whether the putative joint employer
determined the number of full-time and daily hires to be employed
by the direct employer,195 and (5) whether the putative joint em-
ployer held out the direct employer’s employees as its own.196 Sig-
nificantly, the ALJ also distinguished this case from Southern
California Gas Co.197 Although CNN America is on appeal,198 the de-
cision points to a possible Board trend of loosening the joint em-
189 Id at 661.
190 CNN America, Inc., Nos. 5-CA-31828, 5-CA-33125, 2008 WL 6524258 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges Nov. 19, 2008).
191 Id. at *11.
192 See Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass’n, 11 F.3d 302 (1st Cir. 1993).
193 See Continental Group, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Sept. 30, 2008), slip op. at 9;
D&F Industries, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 618, 640 (2003).
194 See Quantum Resources Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 759, 760–61 (1991).
195 See D&F Industries, 339 N.L.R.B. at 640; Capitol EMI Music, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B.
997, 1000, 1017 (1993).
196 Capitol EMI Music, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. at 1017.
197 CNN America, Inc., Nos. 5-CA-31828, 5-CA-33125, at *11 n.10 (citing S. Cal. Gas
Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 456, 461 (1991)).
198 NABET–CWA Local 31 Washington, D.C., Further Update Information on
NLRB vs. CNN/Team Video (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.nabet31.org/level1.cfm?ID
=21 (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
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ployer standard to look more like the expansive FLSA standard,
helping to unify jointly-employed workers with their singularly-em-
ployed coworkers.
Even in the midst of the “September Massacre” of 2007, when
the Board issued a stinging series of anti-union decisions,199 the
Board reversed precedent and upheld a union’s right to continue
representing workers after merging with another union. In Kravis
Center for the Performing Arts, the Board ruled that the lack of due
process during a union merger or affiliation does not, in and of
itself, allow an employer to withdraw recognition of the union sub-
sequent to the merger or affiliation.200 The Board determined that
such a due process requirement was no longer appropriate after a
Supreme Court decision, NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees of
America Local 1182 (Seattle–First), and that because the union had
majority collective bargaining representative status, the employer
was precluded from withdrawing recognition.201 Following similar
logic, the Board also found that when one union disaffiliates with
another, resulting in two unions claiming exclusive representation
of a bargaining unit, the employer must recognize the union that
can demonstrate practical continuity in representation.202 This de-
cision ensured that Workers United, an SEIU affiliate, will be able
to continue representing the 150,000 workers that disaffiliated
from another union UNITE HERE.203 If management tactics and
199 See generally Lofaso, supra note 156 (One of the most jarring decisions came in
Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007), when the Board ruled that employers must
notify workers that they have a 45-day window to file for union decertification after
learning that the employer has voluntarily recognized the union). However, labor
advocates may be able to use language from some of the September Massacre dissents,
now that the NLRB will likely have a Democratic majority. For example, Board Mem-
ber Dennis P. Walsh’s dissents in Intermet Stevensville, 350 N.L.R.B. 1349 (2007) (In-
termet I) and Intermet Stevensville, 350 N.L.R.B. 1270 (2007) (Intermet II), where
the Board refused to issue Gissel bargaining orders pursuant to NLRB v. Gissel Pack-
ing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) for egregious violations of the NLRA, may offer a basis
for issuing more bargaining orders as soon as the Democrats control the NLRB.
200 Raymond F. Kravis Ctr. for the Performing Arts, 351 N.L.R.B. 143 (2007), aff’d,
Raymond F. Kravis Ctr. for the Performing Arts, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.3d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
201 Id.
202 This principle was the culmination of five decisions by NLRB Regional Directors
in Michigan (Continental Linen Servs., Inc., No. GR-7-RM-1491 (June 30, 2009)),
Ohio (Premair of Cleveland, L.L.C., No. 8-RM-1111 (June 30, 2009)), Missouri (Gate-
way Packaging Co. of Mo., No. 17-RM-864 (June 25, 2009)), Minnesota (Radisson
Duluth Hotel, No. 18-RM-1380 (Aug. 4, 2009)), and California (Royal Laundry, No.
20-RM-2868 (June 12, 2009)) (finding continuity of representation was demonstrated
by same stewards, local officers, and union staff continuing to bargain and administer
the contracts).
203 Press Release, Workers United, Workers United Wins Landmark National Labor
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union infighting grow fiercer, these decisions will help ensure that
workers will stay united and not lose their right to union
representation.
C. NLRB & Courts Limiting Independent Contractor Exemption to
NLRA
The NLRB and federal courts have also recently ruled against
dividing workers in the area of independent contractors. Under
the 1947 Taft–Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA, independent
contractors were excluded from the definition of “employees” and
were thus unprotected under the NLRA.204 In 2008, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a ruling by the Republican-dominated NLRB that taxi
cab drivers—workers whose “independent contractor” status is cur-
rently hotly contested—are to be considered covered “employees”
for the purposes of the NLRA.205 In that case, NLRB v. Friendly Cab
Co., the court applied the standard common-law agency test to find
that the taxi cab company had violated the NLRA by not recogniz-
ing its drivers’ authorized union.206 The court weighed a set of fac-
tors207 under a totality of the circumstances standard, and stated
that while no one factor is decisive, the outcome “rests primarily
upon the amount of supervision that the putative employer has a
right to exercise over the individual, particularly regarding the de-
tails of the work.”208 In addition to Friendly Cab Co., the NLRB ruled
in favor of “employee” status over “independent contractor” status
Relations Board Decision (July 22, 2009), available at http://workersunitedunion.
org/content/workers-united-wins-landmark-national-labor-relations-board-decision.
204 NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006); see also House Report on Taft–Hartley
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 80–245 (1st ed. 1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 309 (1948) (“‘Employees’ work for
wages or salaries under direct supervision. ‘Independent contractors’ undertake to do
a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work,
and depend for their income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what
they pay for goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result, that
is, upon profits.”).
205 NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’g Friendly Cab Co.,
344 N.L.R.B. 528 (2005). Bush-appointed Chairman Battista and Member
Schaumber, along with Clinton-appointed Member Liebman, took part in the
decision.
206 Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1098, 1103.
207 Some of the factors considered included: (1) the company’s ability to control
the drivers’ conduct; (2) the company’s strict disciplinary and dress codes; (3) the
requirement that drivers carry advertisements without compensation; (4) the drivers’
risk of loss and opportunity for profit; (5) the lack of drivers’ proprietary interest in
the business; (6) and the prohibitions on entrepreneurial opportunities available to
the drivers. Id. at 1097, 1099.
208 Id. at 1096–97 (quoting SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 357 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
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in several other cases during the George W. Bush presidency,209
demonstrating that decisions uniting workers can come even dur-
ing the darkest days of a Republican-controlled Board.
These recent cases, together with President Barack Obama’s
pro-worker appointments to the NLRB and the proposed Em-
ployee Free Choice Act, show that the NLRA is a statutory regime
worth saving. Indeed, the NLRA’s fundamental purpose is to bal-
ance the power disparities between employers and workers by pro-
moting unity among workers. A fully-funded NLRB can carry out
its mandate to enforce the NLRA. And by organizing for greater
political power and expanding the applications of pro-union court
and Board decisions, labor advocates can push the NLRA back to
its pro-collective bargaining roots.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NLRA and the FLSA each have long and tumultuous his-
tories. However, the NLRA’s protection of collective action by
workers has been beaten beyond recognition, whereas the FLSA’s
enforcement of a baseline of minimum individual workplace rights
has been left relatively unscathed. Perhaps this is the result of the
business class’s fear of the NLRA’s purported objective: to affirma-
tively address the power imbalance at the workplace by encourag-
ing worker unity and collective bargaining for a voice at work. Of
course, employers generally dislike having to give workers more
money and benefits, but not as much as they resent having to face
209 See, e.g., Igramo Enter., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1337 (2007), aff’d, NLRB v. Igramo
Enter., Inc., 310 F. App’x 452 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that drivers for employer that
operated medical courier service were employees and not independent contractors
after weighing the factors from the common law agency test); Community Bus Lines,
341 N.L.R.B. 474 (2004) (finding that, under common law agency test, shuttle bus
drivers were employees, not independent contractors); BKN, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 143,
144 (2001) (using common law agency test, the Board “considered all the incidents of
the individual’s relationship to the employing entity,” to determine that freelance
writers, artists, and designers were employees, not independent contractors); FedEx
Home Delivery, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 16 (2007) (finding that FedEx committed an unfair
labor practice by refusing to bargain with FedEx drivers’ authorized union since,
under common law agency test, drivers were employees and not independent contrac-
tors), rev’d, FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In revers-
ing the Board’s decision in favor of employee status in FedEx Home Delivery, the D.C.
Circuit arguably failed to apply the common law agency test—which focuses on a
putative employer’s control over the work—and instead created a new test based
solely on the workers’ entrepreneurial opportunities. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d
at 504–18 (Garland, J. dissenting); see also posting of Mitchell H. Rubenstein to Ad-
junct Law Prof blog, D.C. Circuit Issues Major Decision Defining Employee Status
Under NLRA, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/2009/04/dc-circuit-
issues-major-decision-defining-employee-status-under-nlra.html (Apr. 23, 2009).
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their workers across the table and bargain the terms and condi-
tions of employment, thereby acknowledging that they have lost
some control of the workplace. But despite workers’ diminution in
power under the NLRA, only it—and not the FLSA—provides the
statutory regime on which workers must rely when they collectively
fight for respect and dignity on the job and equality with the em-
ployer. And recent case law and President Barack Obama’s ap-
pointments to the NLRB indicate that the NLRA will still be there
to support workers’ collective action. When it was passed, the
NLRA was viewed as a radical piece of legislation. With more pro-
union NLRB and court interpretations, the NLRA can embolden a
unified worker movement for respect and dignity on the job.

